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NOTES
SCRUTINY FOR THE SERPENT: THE COURT
REFINES ENTRAPMENT LAW IN JACOBSON
v. UNITED STA TES *
Since the United States Supreme Court first recognized and applied the
doctrine of entrapment as a defense in a criminal prosecution in 1932,1 it has
struggled to define the precise parameters of the defense. Initially, the en-
trapment debate focused on whether applicability of the defense should in-
clude scrutiny of the defendant's state of mind, or "predisposition" to
commit the crime,2 or whether a court should look solely at the conduct of
* It appears that the entrapment defense was first raised by Eve in the Garden of Eden,
who, when accused of eating the forbidden fruit, protested: "The serpent beguiled me, and I
did eat." Genesis 3:13 (King James). See Roger D. Groot, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I
(Without Scienter) Did Eat-Denial of Crime and the Entrapment Defense, 1973 U. ILL. L. F.
254.
1. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). In Sorrells, the Supreme Court made
the entrapment defense available in appropriate cases because of the unconscionability of pun-
ishing a person for a crime that would not have been committed were it not for the govern-
ment's involvement. Id. at 444-45.
Governmental involvement in crime usually entails police undercover operations, which
have long been ethically problematic because of the government's participation in the criminal
activity and the fear such participation instills in the populace. See Jonathan C. Carlson, The
Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment Defense, 73 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1012
(1987) (noting that the use of informants to obtain evidence "is a feared tool of government
oppression, used historically by repressive regimes seeking to suppress their political oppo-
nents"). Yet police undercover activity remains an integral part of the overall law enforcement
scheme because of the difficulty inherent in detecting and prosecuting consensual crimes, such
as drug trafficking, prostitution, gambling, and bribery. See Fred W. Bennett, From Sorrells to
Jacobson: Reflections on Six Decades of Entrapment Law, and Related Defenses, in Federal
Court, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829, 831 (1992); Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy,
60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 164 (1976); Paul W. Williams, The Defense of Entrapment and Related
Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 399, 403-04 (1959). The entrapment
defense, properly applied, would therefore serve to "balance individual rights and liberties with
legitimate law enforcement objectives." Maura F.J. Whelan, Comment, Lead Us Not into (Un-
warranted) Temptation: A Proposal to Replace the Entrapment Defense with a Reasonable-Sus-
picion Requirement, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1193, 1197 (1985).
2. E.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451-52.
Commentators and jurists have termed this view the "subjective" approach. See infra notes
53-54 and accompanying text (discussing the subjective approach to the entrapment defense,
which calls for scrutiny of the defendant's predisposition in weighing the entrapment
question).
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the particular law enforcement agency and inquire whether such conduct
represented an improper use of governmental power.' More recently, the
Court has stated that the entrapment question focuses on both the predispo-
sition and inducement elements,4 with predisposition being "'the principal
element in the defense of entrapment.' "- Since the Court has firmly estab-
lished predisposition as the primary focus of a defendant's entrapment
claim,6 the entrapment debate has shifted in an attempt to formulate a satis-
factory definition of predisposition.7
The United States Supreme Court, in Jacobson v. United States,' inched
closer to a precise formulation of predisposition by holding that a prosecutor
must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant was predis-
posed to commit the charged crime before being approached by law enforce-
ment officers. 9 The case involved Keith Jacobson, a Nebraska farmer who
was the target of a variety of government sting operations'0 designed to ex-
3. E.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. at 378 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453
(Roberts, J., concurring). Commentators have termed this view the "objective" approach. See
infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (discussing the objective approach to the entrap-
ment defense, which focuses exclusively on the nature of the government's inducement).
4. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988).
5. Id. (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973)).
6. Id.; see also Bennett, supra note 1, at 834 (stating that the entrapment inquiry "fo-
cuses exclusively on the defendant's predisposition; the nature of the police conduct involved is
irrelevant"); Park, supra note 1, at 180-82 (discussing the relative ease with which a defendant
can raise the issue of inducement and that, with respect to entrapment, "[tihe focus [is] ... on
the issue of predisposition rather than on the issue of whether the police conduct was reason-
able"); Whelan, supra note 1, at 1204 (noting that "any defendant found to be predisposed will
be convicted regardless of the excessiveness of the inducement").
7. See infra notes 162-84 and accompanying text (discussing divisions among lower fed-
eral courts regarding predisposition).
8. 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
9. Id. at 1540 (citing United States v. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481, 1483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
10. Id. at 1538. Jacobson was approached by a number of government-created organiza-
tions over the course of the federal government's thirty month effort to ensnare him. Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 5-12, Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992) (No. 90-1124).
The first such contact was made in January, 1985 by a postal inspector who addressed a letter
to Jacobson from the fictitious American Hedonist Society (AHS). Brief for the United States
at 4, Jacobson (90-1124). The AHS was a sting operation run by an association of postal
inspectors for the central region of the Unites States based in Madison, Wisconsin. Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 6, Jacobson (No. 90-1124). Jacobson was later contacted by two addi-
tional fictitious organizations, the Heartland Institute for a New Tomorrow (HINT) and Mid-
lands Data Research (MDR). Id. at 7. HINT purported to be a lobbying organization seeking
to liberalize legislation regulating sexual conduct. Id. MDR held itself out as research firm
that conducted consumer surveys on a variety of subjects. Both organizations were designed
to identify a target's sexual preferences. Id.
Jacobson was also a target of Project Looking Glass, an undercover sting operation run by
the postal service and designed to identify and prosecute pedophiles and others who use the
mails to receive child pornography. Id. at 8-9 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 915 F.2d 521
(9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1686 (1991)). As part of this operation, the govern-
ment contacted Jacobson in March, 1987, under the guise of the Far Eastern Trading Co. Id.
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pose violators of the Child Protection Act of 1984." The Act criminalized
the knowing receipt of child pornography through the mails.' 2 Jacobson
became a target after he had ordered two Bare Boys magazines containing
sexually explicit photographs of minors, prior to the enactment of the Child
Protection Act.' 3 After the Act's passage and over the course of two and
one half years, Jacobson was approached by both postal inspectors and cus-
toms officials, disguised as a variety of hedonist organizations 4 and a ficti-
at 11. This organization purported to deliver child pornography materials to its customers via
the Virgin Islands, so as to circumvent the reach of United States customs officials. Brief for
the United States at 8-9, Jacobson (90-1124).
The Customs Service was also running Operation Borderline, a sting operation, designed to
target individuals suspected of importing child pornography. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
12, Jacobson (No. 90-1124). In March, 1987, a sham Canadian organization called "Produit
Outaouais," created by the customs service, sent a brochure to Jacobson that advertised photo-
graphs of boys engaged in sexual activity. Brief for the United States at 7-8, Jacobson (No. 90-
1124).
11. Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2257 (1984)). The Act
was passed in response to the "national tragedy" caused by "[t]he creation and proliferation of
child pornography." H.R. REP. No. 536, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1983), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 492.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. 11 1985). The statute provides:
(a) Any person who- ....
(2) knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction that has been trans-
ported or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce or mailed or knowingly
reproduces any visual depiction for distribution in interstate or foreign com-
merce or through the mails, if-
(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
Id.
13. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1537-38. In February of 1984, three months prior to the pas-
sage of the Child Protection Act, Jacobson ordered magazines entitled Bare Boys I and Bare
Boys II from Dennis Odom, a California pornographer. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5,
Jacobson (No. 90-1124). In May of 1984, law enforcement officials executed a search warrant
of Odom's place of business in San Diego and seized a mailing list containing Jacobson's name.
Id. Law enforcement officials then forwarded Jacobson's name and address to postal inspec-
tors, who later initiated contact with Jacobson. Id. at 6.
14. See supra note 10. Significantly, these organizations couched their overtures in liber-
tarian terms, appealing not merely to the target's purient instincts, but to more noble First
Amendment values. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1542. One such fictitious organization, for exam-
ple, implied that more than mere sexual freedom was at stake, claiming that " 'freedom of the
press is under attack. We must be ever vigilant to counter attack right wing fundamentalists
who are determined to curtail our freedoms.'" Id. at 1538 (quoting Record, Government
Exhibit 9). Further, the bogus organization claimed to channel the proceeds of its catalogue
sales toward lobbying efforts in support of legislation favoring sexual freedom. Id. at 1542.
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tious, like-thinking pen pal,' 5 all of whom explored Jacobson's willingness to
violate the law.' 6
Jacobson's communications with the various government-created organi-
zations revealed his affinity for material depicting young men engaged in
homosexual activity. 17 In the spring of 1987, an organization created by the
Customs Service sent Jacobson a brochure from which Jacobson ordered an
outlawed magazine.' 8 For reasons that are not clear in the record, however,
the order went unfilled. '" Subsequently, in May of 1987, Jacobson placed an
order with an organization created by the Postal Service for Boys Who Love
Boys, a publication containing child pornography.20 Jacobson was arrested
upon delivery of the publication. 2' A search of Jacobson's home incident to
the arrest uncovered the Bare Boys magazines purchased legally by Jacobson
in 1984, and evidence of his correspondence with the government-created
organizations, but no other evidence of an interest in child pornography.22
Jacobson was convicted in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Nebraska for receiving child pornography through the mails in viola-
tion of the Child Protection Act.23 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed,24 holding that Jacobson had been entrapped as a
matter of law. 25 The Eighth Circuit further instructed that before the gov-
ernment can lawfully target an individual in a sting operation, it must have a
"reasonable suspicion 26 based on articulable facts" that the target was
15. Brief for the United States at 6-7, Jacobson (No. 90-1124). A postal inspector, using
the pseudonym of Carl Long, wrote to Jacobson in an effort to engage him in a dialogue and
thus acquire information as to his tastes. Id. at 6. The postal inspector employed a technique
known as "mirroring," in which the government agent expresses interests similar to those of
the target in the hope that the target will more readily divulge information. Id. at 6 n.5.
16. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1538.
17. Id. at 1538-39. Early on in the process, Jacobson rated his enjoyment of pre-teen sex
as a "two" on a scale of four. Id. at 1538. Later, he admitted his interest in "teen-age sexual-
ity," id., and in materials depicting "good looking young guys" engaged in homosexual activ-
ity. Id. at 1539.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1539-40.
21. Id. at 1540.
22. Id.
23. Id. With regard to the entrapment issue, the jury was instructed that "[i]f the defend-
ant before contact with law enforcement officers" was not predisposed to commit the crime and
"was induced or persuaded" by the government to commit the crime, then he was entrapped.
Id. at 1540 n.l (emphasis added).
24. United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999 (8th Cir.), vacated on reh'g, 899 F.2d 1549
(8th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
25. Id. at 1002.
26. The reasonable suspicion requirement imposed upon the government by the Eighth
Circuit panel was based on regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, which provided
that "information concerning an individual shall be collected and maintained only if it is rea-
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predisposed to commit the crime.27 A petition for rehearing with a sugges-
tion for rehearing en banc was granted,2" and on rehearing, the en banc
court of appeals reinstated Jacobson's conviction. The Eighth Circuit held
that the Government had carried its burden of showing predisposition and
rejected the reasonable suspicion requirement.2 9 The court stated that ques-
tionable governmental conduct would negate a conviction only if the con-
duct violated the target's due process rights.3°
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 3' and reversed the
decision of the Eighth Circuit.32 The Court held that the Government failed
to establish that Jacobson was predisposed to commit the charged crime
prior to his contact with law enforcement officials.33 The majority conceded
that Jacobson "had become predisposed to break the law by May 1987."
31
In addition, the Government conceded that it induced Jacobson. 35 Accord-
ingly, the only issue before the Court was whether Jacobson's predisposition,
existing before the solicitation to commit the crime, would operate to sustain
the conviction, or whether the government was required to prove the exist-
ence of a predisposition at the time of the government's first contact with the
target. 36 The majority concluded that in cases where inducement is estab-
sonably suspected that the individual is involved in criminal activity and that the information
is relevant to that criminal activity." 28 C.F.R. § 23.20(a) (1990). The Government argued
before the Supreme Court that a violation of these guidelines did not establish entrapment as a
matter of law, and that even if a violation of the regulations did establish entrapment, the
government had not violated the regulations. Brief of the United States at 35-37, Jacobson
(No. 90-1124).
27. Jacobson, 893 F.2d at 1000 (footnote added). Although the panel agreed with the jury
that Jacobson was predisposed to commit the charged crime, it reversed Jacobson's conviction
because the evidence of predisposition was "tainted by the illegal targeting." Id. at 1002.
28. United States v. Jacobson, 899 F.2d 1549 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1535
(1992).
29. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd, 112 S.
Ct. 1535 (1992).
30. Id. at 468.
31. 111 S. Ct. 1618 (1991).
32. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1537 (1992). A majority of five justices
reversed the decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy
dissented. Id. at 1543.
33. Id. at 1537.
34. Id. at 1541.
35. Id. at 1540 n.2.
36. Compare the Court's formulation, holding that the Government must prove that the
defendant was predisposed "prior to first being approached by Government agents," id. at
1540 (citing United States v. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481, 1483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1991)), with the dis-
sent's contention "that a defendant's predisposition is to be assessed as of the time the Govern-
ment agent first suggested the crime, not when the Government agent first became involved."
Id. at 1544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372-76
(1958)).
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lished, the government must show that its target was predisposed to commit
the crime at a time prior to its initial contact with the target.37
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that requiring that the
government prove predisposition at the time of its first encounter with the
target was tantamount to imposing upon the government the same reason-
able suspicion test rejected by the Eighth Circuit. 8 In addition, the dissent
contended that the jury's finding that Jacobson was predisposed was reason-
able and should not have been disturbed. 39 Finally, Justice O'Connor ar-
gued that the Court had effectively imposed upon the government the
requirement that it demonstrate the defendant's predisposition to commit
the crime knowingly in order to overcome an entrapment claim.
40
This Note examines the United States Supreme Court's refinement of the
parameters of the entrapment defense. It first explores the two conflicting
approaches that have defined entrapment law since its initial recognition by
the Supreme Court, focusing on the intellectual source, the bases for criti-
cism, and the judicial philosophy reflected by each theory. This Note then
surveys recent entrapment decisions authored by the federal courts of ap-
peals and identifies a split between the courts with respect to the time at
which the prosecution must prove the existence of predisposition. Next, this
Note analyzes the majority and dissenting opinions in Jacobson. It argues
that Jacobson's clarification of the definition of predisposition necessitates
careful, though not overly burdensome, scrutiny of the government's con-
duct in cases where the government induces its target. This Note concludes
that the majority's approach will result in the enactment of a more reliable
mechanism by which society's interest in effective law enforcement can more
agreeably coexist with an individual's interest in freedom from oppressive
governmental conduct.
I. TOWARD A VIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT FREE FROM
SCRUTINY
The United States Supreme Court first applied the entrapment defense in
the landmark case of Sorrells v. United States,4 1 a decision in which the dif-
37. Id. at 1540.
38. Id. at 1545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1546.
40. Id.
41. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). The entrapment doctrine was first applied by a federal appellate
court seventeen years previously. See Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915)
(reversing the conviction of a defendant whose resistance to commit the crime charged was
overcome by the repeated solicitations of an undercover agent). The entrapment issue reached
the Supreme Court in 1928, when Justice Brandeis, in a dissenting opinion, called for its adop-
tion, arguing that "Ithis prosecution should be stopped, not because some right of [the defend-
ant] has been denied, but in order to protect the Government. To protect it from illegal
1032 [Vol. 42:1027
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ferent formulations advanced by the majority and concurring justices re-
flected the schism between the subjective and objective definitions of the
entrapment defense.4 2 In Sorrells, a government agent, whose admitted pur-
pose was to prosecute bootleggers, attempted to purchase liquor from the
defendant during the prohibition era.4 3 The agent solicited the defendant
three times before the defendant acquiesced." Further, there was no evi-
dence that the defendant was involved in bootlegging activity prior to his
contact with the agent.4 5
A majority of the Court, per Chief Justice Hughes, formulated a theory of
entrapment under which a court would consider the predisposition and un-
lawful intent of the defendant in deciding the dispositive question of whether
the government is seeking to prosecute an "otherwise innocent" defendant
for a crime fabricated by the government.4 6 Justice Roberts, however,
would have focused exclusively on the government's conduct in deciding the
entrapment issue, noting that courts could not countenance outrageous gov-
ernmental conduct simply because a defendant is predisposed.4 7 For the
next fifty-five years, the two competing formulations enunciated in Sorrells
remained at the center of the debate over the proper inquiry regarding the
entrapment defense.
A. The Subjective Approach
The focus on predisposition, which commanded a majority of the Supreme
Court in Sorrells, was again applied in Sherman v. United States." Sherman
involved a government agent who happened upon his target while both men
conduct of its officers. To preserve the purity of its courts." Casey v. United States, 276 U.S.
413, 425 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398
(1970).
42. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
43. Sorrells, 287 U.S at 439-40.
44. Id. at 439.
45. Id. at 441.
46. Id. at 451. The Sorrells Court noted that "[t]he predisposition and criminal design of
the defendant are relevant ... to the controlling question whether the defendant is a person
otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is
the product of the creative activity of its own officials." Id. The key phrase in this formulation
is "otherwise innocent," which makes relevant the inquiry into the defendant's disposition.
See Linda L. Dukes, Comment, The Entrapment Defense, 10 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 591, 594
(1986) (noting that the predisposition inquiry serves to determine whether the defendant is
otherwise innocent, and thus entrapped).
47. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring). "The applicable principle is that
courts must be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the government's own agents." Id.
When the government acts so as to instigate a crime, such activity is not to be "condoned and
rendered innocuous" by the existence of predisposition. Id.
48. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
1993] 1033
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were undergoing treatment for narcotics addiction.4 9 The agent requested
that the target supply him with narcotics on a number of occasions, appeal-
ing to the target's empathy as a fellow sufferer.50 Eventually, the target ac-
quiesced.-" In throwing out the subsequent conviction and holding that the
defendant had been entrapped as a matter of law,5 2 the Court focused on the
conduct of the law enforcement agent and asked whether such conduct
served to "'implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to
commit the alleged offense.' ,3 The majority's approach necessitated a
thorough inquiry into the defendant's predisposition in order to resolve the
entrapment issue.54
1. Elements
The predisposition inquiry is made necessary by principles of statutory
construction. 5 For adherents to the subjective approach, therefore, the very
basis for the entrapment doctrine results from the conclusion that legisla-
tures, in enacting criminal enforcement statutes, could not have intended to
punish innocent citizens lured into the commission of crimes manufactured
by the government.5 6 A literal interpretation of a statute that fails to recog-
49. Id. at 371.
50. Id. The government agent and his target met by chance on a number of occasions.
Conversations between the two men centered on "discussion[s] of mutual experiences and
problems, including their attempts to overcome addiction to narcotics." Id. The agent pro-
posed a number of solicitations, each "predicated on [the agent's] presumed suffering." Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 373.
53. Id. at 372 (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932)). In the oft-
quoted language that captures the essence of the predisposition approach, the Court later
noted that, in weighing the entrapment issue, "a line must be drawn between the trap for the
unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." Id.
54. Id. at 373 (citing Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451).
55. See Michael A. DeFeo, Entrapment As A Defense to Criminal Responsibility. Its His-
tory, Theory and Application, I U.S.F. L. REV. 243, 251 (1967) (noting that "[t]he rationale of
[the Sorrells Court] was that of statutory construction"); Park, supra note 1, at 246 (stating
that the subjective approach to the entrapment defense is rooted in the intent of the legislature
as it enacts criminal statutes); Dukes, supra note 46, at 594 (noting that "[c]ourts have recog-
nized an implied exception in criminal statutes regarding entrapped persons").
56. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448. The Court stated it was:
unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in enacting this statute
that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the instigation by
government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to
lure them to its commission and to punish them.
Id. Subsequent decisions have affirmed this rationale. See, e.g., Hampton v. United States,
425 U.S. 484, 488 (1976) (noting that entrapment was a "statutory defense"); United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) (noting that the defense "is rooted ... in the notion that
Congress could not have intended criminal punishment" for offenders induced by the govern-
ment); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (1958) (stating that "Congress could not have intended that
its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations").
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nize the perceived intent of the legislature would thus result in injustice in
cases where an entrapped defendant violated a particular criminal statute.57
The fundamental entrapment inquiry, therefore, framed in terms of the
legislative intent rationale, is whether the evidence supporting the invocation
of the defense suggests that the particular defendant is outside the class of
criminals that the legislature seeks to punish."8 Since the statute purport-
edly applies only where governmental conduct does not amount to induce-
ment of an innocent person, entrapment situations fall beyond the scope of
the statute and nullify any literal violation of the law.59 Under this formula-
tion, the question of whether there was entrapment in a given case, like any
question that asks whether a defendant's conduct fits within the ambit of a
particular criminal statute, is one of fact that is properly left with the jury.'
The subjective approach, with its basis in statutory interpretation, reflects
a more conservative, non-activist judicial philosophy. Under the subjective
approach, a court's function is merely to construe the particular statute so as
While many have criticized the legislative intent basis for the defense as "fictitious," see
infra note 69 and accompanying text, this criticism, sixty years after Sorrells, can no longer be
considered valid. See Park, supra note 1, at 247. Professor Park argued that while "[p]erhaps
there was some justification for describing the legislative intent rationale as 'fictitious' when
entrapment doctrine was still in its formative stages," id., congressional silence on the subject
of entrapment amounts to an implied adoption of the Sorrells doctrine: "The entrapment de-
fense has [long] been recognized by the United States Supreme Court .... Surely there is
nothing extraordinary in assuming that Congress intends its enactments to be subject to the
entrapment defense." Id.
57. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 446; see Ralph A. Rossum, The Entrapment Defense and The
Teaching of Political Responsibility: The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 6 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 287, 290-91 (1978) (noting that the entrapment defense provides relief for those
innocents "who have been lured by law enforcement officials to the commission of the
offense").
58. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452 (reasoning that "the question is whether the defense, if the
facts bear it out, takes the case out of the purview of the statute because it cannot be supposed
that the Congress intended that the letter of its enactment should be used to support such a
gross perversion of its purpose").
59. Id.; see also Bennett, supra note 1, at 834 (noting that "a defendant with no criminal
predisposition, who government agents urge to commit a criminal act, would fall outside the
scope of the applicable statute").
60. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452; Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants,
Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1101-02 (1951) (noting that
since "the defense is available not on the ground that the accused though guilty may go free
but for the reason that he is not guilty [that is, his conduct falls outside the scope of the
criminal statute]. Whether or not there was entrapment is for the jury as an element of its
findings of guilty or not guilty."); see also Sherman, 356 U.S. at 377 (holding that the entrap-
ment question is one for the jury "unless it can be decided as a matter of law"); Bennett, supra
note 1, at 834 (stating that the entrapment question must be answered by the jury "[b]ecause
entrapment bears on the guilt or innocence of the accused"); Park, supra note 1, at 268 (noting
that entrapment is a jury issue because "the primary purpose of the subjective approach is
acquittal of 'innocent' (nondisposed) persons, since questions of the guilt or innocence of a
particular defendant have traditionally been issues for the jury").
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to avoid an unjust result.61 The Sorrells Court applied this philosophy in
rejecting the argument that a finding of entrapment results in a grant of
immunity to the defendant. 62 A finding that a defendant has violated a
given statute, yet nonetheless should be granted immunity based on entrap-
ment, amounts to an unwarranted judicial intrusion on the executive
branch.63
Forty-one years later, the Court echoed this non-interventionist philoso-
phy in stating that the entrapment doctrine was not intended to give the
courts a " 'chancellor's foot' veto over law enforcement practices of which
[they] did not approve." '  In United States v. Russell,65 the Court went on
to note that the judiciary's role is merely to create rules to ensure that consti-
tutional and statutory safeguards are honored; the execution of laws is the
function of the executive branch.66 The entrapment doctrine, derived from a
perceived legislative intent and reflective of a conservative judicial philoso-
phy, is thus a limited defense.67
Critics have raised three basic objections to the subjective approach.68
Most fundamentally, the notion that legislative intent serves as the basis for
the defense has been attacked by judges and commentators as "sheer fic-
tion. ,' Additionally, critics have contended that the application of the sub-
61. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 450; see Rossum, supra note 57, at 292 (noting the limited
grounds for judicial intervention).
62. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 449-50.
63. Id. at 449 (noting succinctly that "[c]lemency is the function of the Executive"); see
Rossum, supra note 57, at 293 (stating that the entrapment defense should not be construed to
give the judiciary the power to pardon a criminal offender, since "[i]t is, after all, to the execu-
tive branch, not the judiciary, that the execution of federal laws is committed").
64. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973). The now-familiar "chancellor's
foot" passage was quoted approvingly in then-Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976).
65. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
66. Id. at 435. The Court offered its view of the separation of powers issue in stating that
"Itihe execution of the federal laws under our Constitution is confided primarily to the Execu-
tive Branch of the Government, subject to applicable constitutional and statutory limitations
and to judicially fashioned rules to enforce those limitations." Id. As a result, the entrapment
doctrine does not give the judicial branch the authority "to dismiss prosecutions for what it
feels to have been 'overzealous law enforcement.' " Id.
67. Id. "Courts following the federal defense will intervene only in those situations 'in
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles
would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a convic-
tion.' " Rossum, supra note 57, at 292 (quoting Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32); see also Park,
supra note 1, at 178 (noting that while the entrapment "defense is easy to raise," it is "su-
premely difficult to establish as a matter of law").
68. For a general discussion of these criticisms, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 5.2(c), at 251-52 (1985 & Supp. 1992) [hereinafter LAFAVE
& ISRAEL].
69. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 379 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Critics have argued that divining a legislative intent not to prosecute an entrapped defendant
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jective approach permits the prosecution to engage in an evidentiary free-for-
all aimed at proving a defendant's predisposition. 7' Finally, subjective ap-
proach opponents argue that reliance on predisposition allows the line be-
tween permissible and impermissible police activity to vary depending upon
results from a strained and unwarranted interpretation of the statute. Thus, "the only legisla-
tive intention that can with any show of reason be extracted from the statute is the intention to
make criminal precisely the conduct in which the defendant has engaged." Id.; see also Carl-
son, supra note 1, at 1037 (noting that the legislative intent rationale is "obviously fictional"
and arguing that "[t]here is no reason to believe that the legislature intended that, in those
cases where the government encouraged the criminal act, the prosecutor should have to pro-
duce evidence of 'predisposition' as an additional element of the crime charged"); Louis M.
Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 1981 Sup. CT.
REV. 111, 129-30 (arguing that "it is painfully obvious that the statutory basis for the defense
is wholly fictional" and glibly stating that "[o]ne looks in vain through the United States
Code for any indication that Congress meant to condition culpability on the defendant's
predisposition").
Since a defendant has violated the terms of the statute regardless of whether he has been
entrapped, the factor that requires a court to dismiss a case on entrapment grounds must be
the nature of the governmental inducement. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 442 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Stewart argued that since a defendant who violated a criminal statute is not
innocent, regardless of the nature of the inducement, the entrapment inquiry's "significant
focus must be on the conduct of the government agents." Id.
70. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (finding that the subjective test
permits the introduction of hearsay, suspicion, rumor and reputation evidence). The majority
opinion in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), noted that "if the defendant seeks
acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry
into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue." Id. at 451. In response,
Justice Stewart argued that the subjective test would permit "the introduction into evidence of
all kinds of hearsay, suspicion, and rumor... in order to prove the defendant's predisposition.
It allows the prosecution ... to rely on the defendant's bad reputation or past criminal activi-
ties .... evidence [which] is not only unreliable ... but ... also highly prejudicial." Russell,
411 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Carlson, supra note 1, at 1039 (arguing that
the subjective inquiry "authorizes an 'open season' on any person who could be shown in a
court of law-through proof of prior crimes, prior bad acts, bad reputation, or other evidence
of bad character-to have a propensity to engage in crime"); Rossum, supra note 57, at 294
(noting that the subjective view "allows for the introduction of often unreliable and highly
prejudicial testimony before an untrained and emotional jury"); Whelan, supra note 1, at 1206-
07 (noting that the subjective test relies on "normally inadmissible evidence such as reputation,
rumor, and criminal history," and arguing that this flaw in the doctrine "can chill the use of
the entrapment defense by those who think that the risk of putting such information before the
jury outweighs their chances of prevailing on the entrapment issue").
Commentators on the other side of the debate have responded to this criticism. Professor
Bennett has stated simply that the solution lies in the enforcement of "evidentiary rules-
especially Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence [which provides that relevant evidence
may be excluded if it is unfairly prejudicial to the defendant]-and to prohibit the government
from using hearsay evidence, reputation evidence or dissimilar bad act evidence to prove pre-
disposition." Bennett, supra note 1, at 865; see also Park, supra note 1, at 248 (arguing that
"[t]here is nothing special about predisposition that requires the use of otherwise inadmissible
hearsay").
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a target's reputation and criminal record. 7' Despite these criticisms, the
subjective test has consistently been recognized and applied in a majority of
jurisdictions.
2. Development: Tipping the Scales Toward a Predisposition Inquiry
The United States Supreme Court did not revisit the entrapment issue for
twenty-six years after Sorrells. In 1958, the Warren Court handed down
decisions in Sherman v. United States,72 and its companion case, Masciale v.
United States.73 Sherman involved a government agent who targeted a nar-
cotics addict undergoing treatment.74 The Court applied the subjective ap-
proach, which looked both to the conduct of the law enforcement official and
71. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that the focus "on the
defendant's innocence or predisposition has the direct effect of making what is permissible or
impermissible police conduct depend upon the past record and propensities of the particular
defendant involved"). Justice Stewart contended that the majority's test would allow the po-
lice to target a person "with a criminal record or bad reputation, and then to prosecute him for
the manufactured crime, confident that his record or reputation itself will be enough to show
that he was predisposed to commit the offense anyway." Id. at 443-44; see also Sherman, 356
U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that permissible law enforcement conduct
should not vary depending upon the nature of the defendant); Carlson, supra note 1, at 1039
(noting "the uncontrolled license that the predisposition test gives to the government to use
even the most extreme inducements against persons" predisposed); Rossum, supra note 57, at
295 (noting that the subjective test "makes what is permissible or impermissible police conduct
dependent upon the prior record and propensities of the particular defendant involved").
This criticism has been answered by the defenders of the doctrinal status quo. See Bennett,
supra note 1, at 865 (noting that the jury weighs the evidence of predisposition along with the
evidence of the government's inducement); Park, supra note 1, at 260 (arguing that the pursuit
of past offenders is a wise use of law enforcement resources because "past offenders are exactly
the persons against whom agents should be allowed to use persuasive inductments [sic]").
72. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
73. 356 U.S. 386 (1958). The Warren Court would later have occasion to review two
additional cases in which entrapment claims were raised. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963), involved a tavern owner who attempted to bribe an officer of the Internal Revenue
Service after being informed that he might be liable for a cabaret tax. The Court held that the
defendant was not entitled to the entrapment defense because he failed to make a threshold
showing of inducement. Id. at 435. The Court declined to adopt a specific theory of entrap-
ment, noting that "under any theory, entrapment has not been shown as a matter of law." Id.
at 436.
The Warren Court rejected another entrapment claim three years later in Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966), a case in which Jimmy Hoffa's attorney was accused of jury tam-
pering. Upon learning that one of the potential jurors was a cousin of the undercover govern-
ment agent, the defendant attorney took steps to buy the juror's vote. Id. at 326. The Court
quickly disposed of the entrapment claim, noting that the events were "a far cry from entrap-
ment." Id. at 332. These two cases did little to clarify the ongoing struggle to define entrap-
ment law.
74. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 371; see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (discussing
the facts in Sherman).
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to the state of mind of the defendant."' In overturning the petitioner's con-
viction,76 the Court examined the Government's evidence of predisposi-
tion.77 Although there was no evidence that the defendant was a player in
the drug trade and no contraband was discovered as a result of a search of
his home,78 the defendant had been previously convicted for the sale and
possession of narcotics.79
If, as Chief Justice Hughes wrote in Sorrells, "an appropriate and search-
ing inquiry" into a defendant's past is necessary to determine whether the
defendant is "otherwise innocent,"8 then surely two previous convictions on
charges related to the alleged offense constitute evidence of predisposition
sufficient to submit the case to the jury.8 ' Yet in deciding that the arguably
predisposed defendant in Sherman had been entrapped as a matter of law,
the Court was clearly troubled by the conduct of the government officials.82
The Sherman analysis was tilted heavily toward scrutiny of governmental
behavior and methodology. 3 So, while the Court stopped short of adopting
the approach espoused by Justice Roberts in Sorrells, it demonstrated a clear
sensitivity to protecting citizens, even those twice convicted for like offenses,
from unwarranted law enforcement activity. 4
75. Id. at 373; see also supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (discussing the elements
of the subjective approach to the entrapment defense).
76. Sherman, 369 U.S. 373. The Court "conclude[d] from the evidence that entrapment
was established as a matter of law." Id.
77. Id. at 375.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
81. Cf id. at 441 (although "[tihere was no evidence that the defendant had ever pos-
sessed or sold any [contraband] prior to the transaction in question," the Sorrells Court re-
manded the case so that the entrapment issue could be submitted to the jury). While there is a
procedural distinction between keeping an issue from the jury, as the concurring Justices in
Sorrells would have had it, id. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring), and reversing a jury's decision,
as the majority in Sherman did, Sherman, 356 U.S. at 378, the comparison between the two
cases illustrates the Warren Court's willingness to more carefully scrutinize law enforcement
activity in weighing the entrapment question.
82. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376. The Sherman Court had little tolerance for the govern-
ment agent's behavior, noting that "[t]he case at bar illustrates an evil which the defense of
entrapment is designed to overcome. The government informer entices someone attempting to
avoid narcotics not only into carrying out an illegal sale but also into returning to the habit of
use." Id.
83. Id. The Court chastised the government for "play[ing] on the weaknesses of an inno-
cent party and beguil[ing] him into committing crimes which he otherwise would not have
attempted. Law enforcement does not require methods such as this." Id.
84. Id.; see Bennett, supra note 1, at 838-39. Professor Bennett observed the Sherman
Court's willingness to scrutinize the government's conduct: "Although the Sherman Court
employed the subjective approach .... [T]he Court did consider the government's conduct in
the case, describing it as 'evil' in that it had enticed a recovering drug addict not only to sell
drugs, but also to use them." Id. (quoting Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376). Indeed, Professor Park
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In Masciale v. United States,"5 the Court was again faced with a defendant
convicted over an entrapment claim,8 6 but here the Court affirmed the con-
viction.8 7 The Masciale Court was not faced with the same type of repre-
hensible governmental conduct as it faced in Sherman.8 The government
agent in Masciale merely approached the target and engaged him in a discus-
sion concerning the narcotics trade.8 9 The target mentioned that he would
be able to acquire eighty-eight percent pure heroin. 90 The defendant ar-
ranged a buy, and an arrest and conviction followed. 9' While there was no
evidence of predisposition apart from the defendant's demonstrated willing-
ness to engage in the criminal activity, the defendant admitted that the jury
could reasonably have found that he was predisposed to commit the charged
crime.92 Coupled with the absence of offensive governmental conduct, this
admission made the Court's decision a fairly easy one.93
The Burger Court did not share the Warren Court's concern with protect-
ing the citizenry from abuses of governmental power. In its first entrapment
case, the Burger Court heightened the importance of predisposition in the
entrapment equation and relaxed the scrutiny given to governmental ac-
tion.94 In United States v. Russell,95 an undercover police officer offered to
supply phenyl-2-propanone, a rare but legally available chemical used to
manufacture methamphetamine, to the defendant in exchange for access to
opined that the particular inducement "would not have caused an average person to commit
the offense." Park, supra note 1, at 174. This suggests that it was clearly the circumstances
surrounding the inducement, and not the defendant's disposition, that fueled the reversal of
the conviction.
85. 356 U.S 386 (1958).
86. Id. at 387.
87. Id. at 388.
88. Compare id. at 387 (discussing the target's quick willingness to engage in the outlawed
conduct at the government agent's suggestion) with Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373 (discussing the
target's eventual capitulation following repeated overtures and attempts to exploit the target's
sympathy).
89. Masciale, 356 U.S. at 387.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 388.
92. Id.
93. The four dissenting justices conceded that the evidence supporting a claim of entrap-
ment seemed "rather thin," but would have remanded the case so that the trial judge, and not
the jury, could weigh the entrapment question. Id. at 389 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
94. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436 (1973) (holding that the nature of the
government's inducement was irrelevant to the defendant's entrapment claim once the govern-
ment had established predisposition).
95. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
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the manufacturing laboratory and one-half of the resulting product.9 6 This
transaction eventually resulted in the defendant's arrest and conviction.97
The defendant conceded that the jury finding with respect to his predispo-
sition was supported by the evidence,98 but argued that the Constitution
could not countenance such a level of governmental participation.99 This
constitutional version of the defense was crafted by making an analogy to
decisions like Mapp v. Ohio '" and Miranda v. Arizona. °  The Russell
Court, per Justice Rehnquist, rejected this approach in this case, noting that
unlike the situations in Mapp and Miranda, the Government's conduct did
not violate the defendant's constitutional right."0 2 The Court did not reject
the outrageous governmental conduct defense outright, but noted in dictum
that if the conduct of governmental officials was particularly reprehensible, it
might recognize such a defense, analytically distinct from the entrapment
doctrine and rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 13
The Court also rejected the defendant's entrapment claim under the tradi-
tional statutory variety of entrapment law, holding that the defendant's con-
cession as to predisposition eliminated the need to scrutinize the govern-
ment's conduct."° Russell, therefore, represented a departure from the ear-
lier Warren Court decisions °5 in that governmental conduct became
irrelevant once predisposition had been established. 10 6 The only exception
96. Id. at 425.
97. Id. at 424. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the district court because the government agent had supplied the defendant with an
essential ingredient for the manufacture of the methamphetamine and thereby had "par-
ticipat[ed] in the criminal enterprise" to "an intolerable degree." United States v. Russell, 459
F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
98. Russell, 411 U.S. at 433.
99. Id. at 430.
100. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (excluding the admissibility of evidence resulting from a search
violative of the Fourth Amendment).
101. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (excluding the admissibility of confessions obtained in violation of
the Fifth Amendment).
102. Russell, 411 U.S. at 430.
103. Id. at 431. The Court recognized that it "may some day be presented with a situation
in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles
would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction
..... Id. This language created the due process defense, which is related to but separate from
the entrapment defense. For discussions of the due process defense, see Roy M. Cohn, The
Need for an Objective Approach to Prosecutorial Misconduct, 46 BROOK. L. REV. 249 (1980);
Richard D. Cleary, Comment, Due Process Defense When Government Agents Instigate and
Abet Crime, 67 GEO. L.J. 1455 (1979). In the years following Russell, criminal defendants
have raised the defense repeatedly. For a discussion of the reluctance of the federal courts to
entertain the due process defense, see infra note 244 and accompanying text.
104. Russell, 411 U.S. at 436.
105. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (discussing the scrutiny given the gov-
ernment's conduct by the Sherman Court).
106. Russell, 411 U.S. at 436.
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to this rule appeared in dictum which suggested that a conviction could be
thrown out if the government's tactics were so outrageous as to violate the
Due Process Clause. 107
In Hampton v. United States, °8 a three-justice plurality of the Court ele-
vated the Russell holding to a per se rule by announcing that the remedy for
outrageous police conduct lay not in overturning the conviction, as the dic-
tum in Russell suggested, but in bringing charges against the offending law
enforcement officials. " The defendant in this case was charged with selling
narcotics that were supplied to him by a government agent."' Though the
plurality recognized that the government agent was more deeply involved in
the criminal scheme than was the agent in Russell,"' this heightened gov-
ernmental role was irrelevant since predisposition had been established.
1' 2
Not surprisingly, the unprecedented weight given to predisposition drew ob-
jections from Justices Powell and Blackmun," 3 both of whom voted with
the majority in United States v. Russell. 4 For these Justices, principles of
107. Id. at 432. The Court intimated that it would allow convictions of predisposed de-
fendants to stand unless the conduct of the law enforcement officials violated "that 'fundamen-
tal fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice,' mandated by the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment." Id. (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234,
246 (1960)).
108. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
109. Id. at 490. The plurality noted that "[i]f the police engage in illegal activity in concert
with a defendant beyond the scope of their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally
culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police under the applicable provisions of state or
federal law." Id. (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428-29 (1976) and O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974)).
110. Id. at 486.
Ill. Id. at 489.
112. Id. at 488-89. The plurality clearly enunciated its break from Sherman, stating that:
[T]he entrapment defense "focus[es] on the intent or predisposition of the defendant
to commit the crime,".. . rather than upon the conduct of the Government's agents.
We ruled out the possibility that the defense of entrapment could ever be based upon
governmental misconduct in a case, such as this one, where the predisposition of the
defendant to commit the crime was established.
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
429 (1973)).
Professor Carlson has similarly recognized the shift in emphasis between entrapment law as
promulgated in Sorrells-Sherman versus the more recent Russell-Hampton decisions.
Whereas a finding of predisposition necessarily doomed an entrapment defense for the Russell
Court, see Russell, 411 U.S. at 436, the nine Justices comprising the Sherman Court "shared
the view that the entrapment defense exists to curb an abusive government practice." Carlson,
supra note 1, at 1032. More to the point, Carlson noted that "(a]lthough the Supreme Court
now insists that the defendant's predisposition is unrelated to the nature of the police conduct
involved, defendants' predispositions have often been weighed with close attention to the na-
ture of the inducements offered." Id. at 1040 (footnotes omitted).
113. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 491 (Powell, J., concurring).
114. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
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due process would preclude a conviction under circumstances where the law
enforcement conduct was particularly outrageous."'
The Hampton plurality opinion was the high water mark for the subjec-
tive approach. In forty-four years, the Court went from Sorrells v. United
States," 6 where predisposition was merely "relevant .... [T]o the control-
ling question [of] whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent" who
was induced by the very government that was now prosecuting him, 7 to
Hampton, where governmental conduct, no matter how outrageous or op-
pressive, did not figure strictly into the entrapment defense of a predisposed
defendant.' 18
B. The Objective Approach
Proponents of the objective approach would eliminate entirely the inquiry
into predisposition and focus exclusively on the conduct of government offi-
cials in deciding the entrapment issue." 9 Any conviction resulting from cir-
cumstances where the conduct of the police constituted an improper use of
governmental power would, under this approach, be thrown out, regardless
of the defendant's mindset.1
20
115. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 (Powell, J., concurring).
116. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
117. Id. at 451.
118. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488-89. For the three-justice plurality, even the most egregious
conduct by law enforcement agents would not bar the conviction of a predisposed defendant.
Id. For concurring Justices Powell and Blackmun, a conviction resulting from egregious gov-
ernmental conduct could be overturned not on the basis of entrapment, but on principles of
due process. Id. at 492-93 (Powell, J., concurring). The dissenters sided with Justice Powell
on this issue, resulting in the survival of the due process defense. Id. at 497 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
119. See id. at 496 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that an entrapped defendant must be
acquitted because of the unconscionability of the government's conduct); United States v. Rus-
sell, 411 U.S. 423, 441 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (contending that the defendant should be
acquitted if the government's action was apt to cause an average person to commit the crime,
"regardless of the predisposition to crime of the particular defendant involved"); Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that courts
should intervene in cases where "the methods employed on behalf of the Government to bring
about a conviction cannot be countenanced"); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 459
(1932) (Roberts, J., concurring) (noting that the only necessary entrapment inquiry is the ques-
tion of the government's conduct).
120. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382; see also Carlson, supra note 1, at 1017 (noting that "[t]he
defendant's subjective characteristics, his character and predisposition, are regarded as irrele-
vant"); Cohn, supra note 103, at 265 (recognizing that, under the objective approach, "[tihe
defendant's predisposition to commit the offense is immaterial"); Park, supra note 1, at 171
(noting that the dispositive issue is "whether an agent used an improper inducement").
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1. Elements: Whether Governmental Conduct Crosses the Line
The objective approach grew out of a concern for the prevention of op-
pressive governmental conduct and an intellectual dissatisfaction with the
statutory basis for the subjective approach to the entrapment defense, 2 ,
The notion that the legislature intended to bar convictions based on circum-
stances involving questionable governmental conduct was, for proponents of
the objective approach, disingenuous.' 22 Irrespective of the nature of the
government's means of detection and enforcement, one who has committed
the criminal act with the requisite intent falls within the ambit of the
statute. 123
What separates the entrapped defendant from the defendant not en-
trapped cannot therefore be predisposition, but is instead the conduct of the
government. 124 The entrapment doctrine rests, therefore, not on some un-
spoken legislative intent, but on public policy grounds: to protect and pre-
serve the integrity of the courts and the law enforcement system.' 25 The
predisposition inquiry, which shifts the focus away from governmental be-
havior, fails to consider this basis for the entrapment doctrine and results in
a less honorable system of justice.
126
121. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 455 (asserting that "the true foundation of the doctrine [lies]
in the public policy which protects the purity of government and its processes"); Bennett,
supra note 1, at 836 n.46 (stating that the basis for the objective approach arose from a need to
protect "the courts from becoming unwilling parties in the prosecution of individuals whose
crimes were induced by government officials"); DeFeo, supra note 55, at 252 (noting that the
basis for the defense was "a strong public policy against what were considered unnecessary and
therefore unjust prosecutions").
122. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 379 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("It is surely sheer fiction to
suggest" that an entrapped defendant cannot be convicted "because 'Congress could not have
intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.' ")
(quoting id. at 372 (majority opinion)); see supra note 69 (summarizing the remarks of critics
of the legislative intent rationale).
123. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 456.
124. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("The courts refuse to convict
an entrapped defendant, not because his conduct falls outside the proscription of the statute,
but because, even if his guilt be admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the Government
to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced.").
125. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457; see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 442-43 (1973)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that a court's function is "to prohibit unlawful governmental
activity in instigating crime .... 'To protect [the government] from illegal conduct of its of-
ficers. To preserve the purity of its courts.'" (quoting Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413,
425 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398
(1970)); Whelan, supra note 1, at 1196 (noting that "[tihe objective approach is animated
exclusively by a concern with whether or not the conduct of the police was acceptable").
126. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382-83 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that "a test that
looks to the character and predisposition of the defendant rather than the conduct of the police
loses sight of the underlying reason for the defense of entrapment .... [That] certain police
conduct ... is not to be tolerated by an advanced society").
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From the premise that the entrapment doctrine is based on the court's
supervisory role comes the conclusion that the question whether a defendant
has been entrapped is better answered by the court and not the jury.'27 The
court is to be aggressive in its role, stopping the proceedings at any stage and
dismissing the defendant should there be a showing of entrapment.
128
This approach reflects a more activist judicial philosophy than does the
subjective approach. Whereas the subjective approach instructed that courts
should not exercise a " 'chancellor's foot' veto" over unpalatable law en-
forcement practices, 29 the objective approach gave judges an affirmative
role in quashing prosecutions born of reprehensible governmental con-
duct. 13' This activist philosophy is reflected in the entrapment test proposed
by Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sherman, which would pre-
clude prosecution if the inducement was such as to ensnare one "who would
normally avoid crime and through self-struggle resist ordinary tempta-
tions."'' This test provided a mechanism by which the courts could ac-
tively evaluate law enforcement technique and mandated the dismissal of
cases where police conduct failed to pass the test. 1
32
Proponents of the subjective approach have identified four general criti-
cisms of the objective test.'33 If the government were not permitted to rebut
the claim of inducement by offering evidence of predisposition, some argue,
law enforcement operations, particularly those targeted at consensual crimi-
nal acts, would be severely undermined.134 Further, opponents of the objec-
127. Id. at 385 (asserting that the entrapment inquiry, "aimed at blocking off areas of
impermissible police conduct, is appropriate for the court and not the jury"); see also Don-
nelly, supra note 60, at 1102 (noting that the objective test is for the court to determine, be-
cause "the question of entrapment has no connection with guilt or innocence"); Dukes, supra
note 46, at 601-02 (noting that the entrapment question "should be decided by the judge be-
cause the preservation of the judicial system belongs to the court").
128. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring). Professor Donnelly has stated that
the defense "may be raised at any point in the proceeding and, if proved, requires the court to
quash the indictment and set the defendant at liberty." Donnelly, supra note 60, at 1102.
129. Russell, 411 U.S. at 435.
130. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457.
131. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The objective test, adopted
by the American Law Institute, is phrased more clearly in the Model Penal Code. Thus,
entrapment will lie if the government agent "employ[s] methods of persuasion or inducement
that create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than
those who are ready to commit it." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1)(b) (1985).
132. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 384-85.
133. For a general discussion of these criticisms, see LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 68,
§ 5.2(d) at 252-53.
134. Two problems emerge when the objective test is analyzed in the context of undercover
police work. First, undercover operations would cease to be a profitable policing tool, dealing
a significant blow to the overall law enforcement scheme. See United States v. Sherman, 200
F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952) (Hand, J.) (noting that "it would be impossible ever to secure
convictions of any offenses which consist of transactions that are carried on in secret") (quoted
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tive approach point to the inherent injustice in granting total immunity to a
defendant who knowingly committed a crime.' 35 A third criticism suggests
that the objective test encumbers the police with too rigid a standard to gov-
ern its behavior.' 3 6 Finally, subjectivists argue that the objective test does
not effectively preserve society's confidence in the criminal justice system.' 
37
in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 434 (1973) and Sherman, 356 U.S. at 377 n.7); see
also Donnelly, supra note 60, at 1093 (noting that informants "are used widely by police forces
the world over"); Williams, supra note 1, at 403-04 (noting, in 1959, that law enforcement
agencies rely heavily upon undercover operators: "It is safe to say that ninety-five per cent of
all federal narcotics cases are obtained as the result of the work of informers").
Second, the objective test would lead to inaccuracy in the factfinding process. The nature of
the inducement, the dispositive issue under the objective test, is "the factual issue least suscep-
tible to reliable proof." Park supra note 1, at 222 (noting further that "[s]ince inducements are
offered in private, the finder of fact will often have to choose between the testimony of an
informer who has a criminal record and that of a defendant who has admittedly committed a
criminal act"); see Bennett, supra note 1, at 866 (noting that jurors will have to believe either
the testimony of the agent or that of the defendant).
135. Russell, 411 U.S. at 434 ("Nor does it seem particularly desirable for the law to grant
complete immunity from prosecution to one who himself planned to commit a crime, and then
committed it ...."). The argument assumes that a shrewd career criminal will not acquiesce
unless the nature of the inducement crosses the objective test's line of demarcation. Thus, the
objective test "creates a risk of acquitting dangerous chronic offenders." Park, supra note 1, at
216. If not acquitted, the savvy chronic offender will avoid prosecution entirely "because he
can only be legally offered those inducements which might tempt a hypothetical, law-abiding
person." Bennett, supra note 1, at 866.
A corollary to this argument is that it creates the danger that nondisposed defendants will be
convicted. Even if the inducement would not have enticed the hypothetical person, it may
ensnare a particularly weak-willed person "who might never have committed the type of crime
charged but for the agent's overtures." Park, supra note 1, at 217.
136. The essence of this point, which is related to the previous criticism, is that the police
should be permitted to tailor their overtures to each particular target. The nature of the in-
ducement is inevitably linked to the target's predisposition. The propriety of the police con-
duct must therefore be analyzed in light of "whether the defendant was a proper target of
police action; whether, if the defendant initially demurred, the police should have persisted in
their efforts to engage him in criminal activity; and, finally, whether the particular inducement
to which the defendant was subjected was excessive." Carlson, supra note 1, at 1045 (footnotes
omitted); see Park, supra note 1, at 220 (arguing that an entrapment test "must necessarily
allow agents substantial leeway" because "an inducement which is fair in the abstract may be
unfair in a particular case"); see also Bennett, supra note 1, at 866 (objecting to the futility of
"[a]ttempts to judge police conduct in a vacuum"); DeFeo, supra note 55, at 275-76 (arguing
that "[e]rrant mankind does not neatly divide into two classes, situational or chronic
violators").
137. Since courts are reluctant to promulgate per se rules to govern law enforcement activ-
ity, "it is doubtful that significant restrictions upon the type of inducements available to police
would result if the Supreme Court adopted the objective approach." Bennett, supra note i, at
866; see Park, supra note 1, at 225 (arguing that "the judiciary will lose respect by embracing




2. Application: Policing the Police
The objective approach to the entrapment doctrine has never been recog-
nized and applied by a majority of the United States Supreme Court. t38 In-
deed, after objecting to the application of the subjective approach on three
occasions following the decision in Sorrells v. United States, 39 Justice Bren-
nan conceded the issue in Mathews v. United States.140
Though the Supreme Court has declined to do so, a number of state courts
have adopted the objective approach.' 4 ' The California Supreme Court's
decision in People v. Barraza,142 which flatly rejected the subjective ap-
proach enunciated by the United States Supreme Court. 43 The defendant
Barraza was a recovering drug addict who, after persistent badgering by an
undercover officer, put the officer in touch with a narcotics dealer.144 The
138. Bennett, supra note 1, at 837.
139. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
140. 485 U.S. 58, 67 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court has spoken definitively
on this point. Therefore I bow to stare decisis, and today join the judgment and reasoning of
the Court."). Justice Brennan dissented in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), joined Justice Stewart's dissent in United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423, 439 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting), and joined Justice Frankfurter in both Sher-
man v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) and Masciale v.
United States, 356 U.S. 386, 389 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
141. The first state supreme court to adopt the objective approach was in Alaska. See
Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alaska 1969). Other state courts have followed suit.
See, e.g.. People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947, 955 (Cal. 1979); State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375,
382 (Iowa 1974); People v. Julliet, 475 N.W.2d 786, 792-93 (Mich. 1991); Baca v. State, 742
P.2d 1043, 1045 (N.M. 1987); State v. Zaccaro, 574 A.2d 1256, 1263 (Vt. 1990).
Other jurisdictions have adopted the objective approach legislatively. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-2-209(b) (Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-709 (1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-
237(1)(b) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3210 (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:5 (1986);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05 (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1976); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313(a)(2) (1983); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.06(a) (West 1974); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-2-303(1) (1990).
Alaska has since adopted an entrapment law that combines the subjective and objective
tests. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.450 (1989). Other jurisdictions follow a similar combined
approach. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 432 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25
(Michie 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 7-12 (Smith-Hurd 1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 505.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); State v. Hunter, 586 So. 2d 319, 321-22 (Fla. 1991);
State v. Johnson, 606 A.2d 315, 323 (N.J. 1992). Briefly, the combined approach calls for
scrutiny of the government's conduct in light of the characteristics of the specific target in-
volved. Thus, "[e]ntrapment has not occurred as a matter of law where police activity (1) has
as its end the interruption of a specific ongoing criminal activity; and (2) utilizes means reason-
ably tailored to apprehend those involved in the ongoing criminal activity." Cruz v. State, 465
So. 2d 516, 522 (Fla.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905 (1985), quoted in Hunter, 586 So. 2d at 322.
142. 591 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1979).
143. Id. at 954. For the California court's rationale for rejecting the Supreme Court's
formulation, see infra note 147.
144. Barraza, 591 P.2d at 949-50. The defendant and the undercover officer offered differ-
ent accounts of what transpired at their meeting. The officer acknowledged that the defendant
was at first "hesitant" to deal because he feared returning to prison, but that he quickly pro-
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trial judge refused to instruct the jury on the entrapment issue,14 5 and Bar-
raza thereafter appealed his conviction.
The California Supreme Court, concerned first and foremost with assuring
the propriety of law enforcement activity,' 46 adopted an objective standard,
which questioned whether "the conduct of the law enforcement agent [was]
likely to induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the offense."
1 47
The California court stated that the entrapment test would focus on whether
the law enforcement activity would create in a law-abiding citizen a motive
for the crime beyond the immediate ill-gotten gain. 148 Alternatively, if the
government agents were to promise an unusually beneficial reward resulting
from the commission of the crime, such conduct would also constitute en-
trapment.' 49 The California court concluded by noting that under its test,
inquiries into the defendant's character or predisposition were irrelevant.' 50
The Michigan Supreme Court has similarly adopted the objective ap-
proach to the entrapment defense applying it in People v. Turner.15 1 Turner
involved a government agent who attempted to purchase heroin from the
defendant. 52 Turner declined to obtain heroin for the informant on a
number of occasions, but eventually acquiesced after the agent told Turner,
untruthfully, that the heroin was for the agent's girlfriend who would stop
dating him if he failed to produce the drug.' 53 The agent provided Turner
vided the officer with the dealer's name once the officer had assured the defendant that she
"'wasn't a cop.' " Id. at 949 (quoting officer's testimony). The defendant, on the other hand,
testified that the officer pestered him for about an hour before he finally acquiesced. He did so,
he testified, only to " 'get her off... [his] back.' " Id. at 949-50 (omission in original).
145. Id. at 952.
146. Id. at 954.
147. Id. at 955. To justify its departure from the test articulated by the United States
Supreme Court, the California court noted that "[c]ommentators ...have overwhelmingly
favored... application of a test which looks only to the nature and extent of police activity in
the criminal enterprise." Id. at 954. In addition, the California court looked to other states
that had adopted a similar approach, either judicially or legislatively. Id. at 955.
148. Id. at 955. Here, the court noted that if the overture to the target attempted to induce
based on sympathy or friendship, rather than pure personal gain, then such conduct would be
impermissible. Id.
149. Id. Here, the court offered inducements which "guarantee that the act is not illegal"
or which include "an offer of exorbitant consideration" as examples of this type of impermissi-
ble governmental conduct. Id.
150. Id. at 956. The approach promulgated by the California Supreme Court in Barraza
differed from the model created by Justice Roberts in that, because of its "substantial effect on
the issue of guilt," the entrapment issue was for the jury. Id. at 956 n.6.
151. 210 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. 1973).
152. Id. at 337-38. The agent's request for heroin was preceded by a two year period in
which the agent unsuccessfully attempted to induce Turner to sell him pills containing narcot-
ics. Id. at 337.
153. Id. at 338.
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with twenty dollars so that Turner could make the purchase. 154 Turner de-
clined future offers to purchase heroin for the agent, but he did agree to put
the informant in touch with his source. 155 Turner was arrested and subse-
quently convicted.' 56
The Michigan court, noting that it was not bound by the United States
Supreme Court's holdings regarding entrapment law,' 57 adopted the objec-
tive test, held that Turner had been entrapped as a matter of law, and re-
versed Turner's conviction.' 58 The court quoted extensively and approv-
ingly from Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in United States v. Russell,' 59
and concluded that the objective test was preferable because it inquired as to
the central issue in entrapment cases: whether the police conduct was so
reprehensible that a conviction resulting from such conduct could not
stand. 1
60
The Michigan court clearly believed that the police's conduct could not be
tolerated. The court cited the police's persistence even after the first investi-
gation failed to produce evidence, the creation of the addicted girlfriend as a
means to play on Turner's sympathy, and the dearth of pre-investigation
evidence linking Turner to the narcotics trade as evidence of the sort of im-
permissible police activity that the courts are charged with prohibiting.
16'
II. TOWARD A WORKABLE PREDISPOSITION DEFINITION
The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Mathews v. United
States,'62 its final pre-Jacobson entrapment decision, effectively settled the
Supreme Court's debate over the subjective and objective approaches.'
63
Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's reaffirmance of the sub-
jective approach in United States v. Russell '64 and Hampton v. United
States,' 65 federal courts have attempted to formulate a more refined defini-
tion of predisposition. Specifically, and critical to the resolution of Jacob-




157. Id. at 341.
158. Id. at 343.
159. Id. at 341-42.
160. Id. at 342.
161. Id. at 343 (noting that the case was an example of "the type of overreaching by the
police .... [that] cannot be permitted to go unchallenged by our Court").
162. 485 U.S. 58 (1988).
163. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
164. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
165. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
166. 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
1993] 1049
Catholic University Law Review
regarding time: at what point in the relationship between inducer and target
must the government demonstrate the target's predisposition in order to
overcome an entrapment claim?
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confronted the
time issue in United States v. Williams,1 67 a case arising out of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's Abscam undercover operation. 16  The case in-
volved Harrison A. Williams, a former United States Senator from New
Jersey who promised to use his office improperly in exchange for a large sum
of money. 169 The court, in affirming Williams's conviction, evaluated the
merits of three different rules to apply to the time issue. 7 °
First, the Second Circuit rejected the rule propounded by the defendant
Williams-that the government must show predisposition at the time of the
agent's first contact with the defendant.17' The court argued that such a rule
would unnecessarily require the courts to scrutinize contact apart from the
actual inducement to commit the charged offense.' 72 The court similarly
rejected the notion that the government must show the existence of predispo-
sition at the time the crime is committed. 73 Instead, the Williams court
167. 705 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007 (1983).
168. Abscam was an operation whereby undercover FBI agents spread word that wealthy
Arabs were prepared to pay bribes to members of the United States Congress in exchange for
favorable immigration legislation. See United States v. Jenrette, 744 F.2d 817, 819 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985). The operation eventually netted an assortment of
corrupt government officials, including seven members of the United States Congress. As
Maura Whelan noted savagely in her commentary, "[s]ome were zealous and some were hesi-
tant, but all were on videotape." Whelan, supra note 1, at 1200. The government won convic-
tions in every Abscam case, and each conviction was affirmed on appeal. See id. at 1203.
For additional commentary concerning Abscam, see Robert I. Blecker, Beyond 1984: Un-
dercover in America-Serpico to Abscam, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 823 (1984); Bennett L.
Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91 YALE L.J. 1565 (1982);
Katherine Goldwasser, After Abscam: An Examination of Congressional Proposals to Limit
Targeting Discretion in Federal Undercover Investigations, 36 EMORY L.J. 75 (1987); Patric M.
Verrone, Note, The Abscam Investigation: Use and Abuse of Entrapment and Due Process De-
fenses, 25 B.C. L. REV. 351 (1984).
169. Williams, 705 F.2d at 606.
170. Id. at 617-19.
171. Id. at 617 (rejecting the assertion made by Williams's attorney at trial, that the Gov-
ernment must show the existence of predisposition " 'from day one' ").
172. Id. at 618 n.9. The court declined to consider the "preliminary contact," that is,
contact apart from the alleged offense. The court reasoned that "[s]ince the entrapment de-
fense exonerates a defendant who has been induced to commit a crime he would not otherwise
have committed, the inducement must consist of efforts to persuade him to commit the crime."
Id. Thus, preliminary contacts had no bearing on the issue.
173. Id. at 618. This rule was incorporated into the charge given to the jury by the trial
judge and was a basis for the appeal. Although the court on appeal conceded that the trial
judge erred in so instructing the jury, the court held that the "erroneous statement ... [did]
not warrant reversal." Id.
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held that the predisposition of the defendant must exist at the time the crimi-
nal conduct is proposed.' 74
The Fourth Circuit followed a similar approach in United States v. Os-
borne. 17  Osborne, like Jacobson, involved a defendant whose arrest and
conviction resulted from a postal service sting operation designed to prose-
cute those who use the mails to receive child pornography. 176 In affirming
Osborne's conviction, the Fourth Circuit held that predisposition must be
evaluated at the time the government agent suggests the crime.
177
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, adopted a different approach in
United States v. Kaminski. 7 8 In this case, the defendant Kaminski ap-
proached a government informant and offered his services as an arsonist.179
The informant put the defendant in touch with another agent, who posed as
a man interested in such a service.180 The defendant agreed to destroy a
building in exchange for $1,000 and was subsequently arrested and
convicted. 
18 1
The Seventh Circuit held that the Government had the burden of demon-
strating the defendant's predisposition before his contact with the govern-
ment officials. 82 Applying this more demanding rule to the case, the court
noted that the defendant had approached the agent and expressed his will-
ingness to engage in arson and concluded that the jury's determination as to
174. Id. The Second Circuit held that if a defendant were "of a frame of mind such that
once his attention is called to the criminal opportunity, his decision to commit the crime is the
product of his own preference," then the entrapment defense would be unavailing. Id
175. 935 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1991), amended on other grounds, No. 90-5691 (4th Cir. Aug.
12, 1991); see also United States v. Hunt, 749 F.2d 1078, 1085 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that
predisposition is to be judged at the time the government agent suggests the crime), cert. de-
nied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985).
176. Osborne, 935 F.2d at 34. The defendant Osborne became a target when he answered
an advertisement placed in a periodical, thereby indicating his interest in purchasing child
pornography. Id.
177. Id. at 37. Even if the Fourth Circuit had applied the rule offered by the Seventh
Circuit, see infra note 182 and accompanying text, the court almost certainly would have
affirmed Osborne's conviction because Osborne initiated the contact with the government
agent and revealed his predisposition simultaneously. Osborne, 935 F.2d at 34.
178. 703 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1983).
179. Id. at 1005.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1006.
182. Id. at 1008. In so holding, the court recognized that the Government must rely on
indirect evidence obtained by examining the defendant's post-contact conduct in order to make
a determination as to predisposition. The court noted that an initial refusal of the agent's
overture was probative of a lack of predisposition. But if the defendant should "initiate con-
tact with the agents in order to commit a crime this is strong proof of predisposition." Id.
The Third Circuit is in accord with the Fourth Circuit with respect to the time issue. See
United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that the relevant
inquiry concerns "the defendant's state of mind before the initial exposure to the government
agents"), rev'd on other grounds, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
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predisposition was not unreasonable.' Thus, these varied interpretations
of the predisposition definition, characterized by the split among the circuit
courts regarding the time issue, would ultimately be resolved by the Supreme
Court in Jacobson v. United States.
184
III. JACOBSON V. UNITED STATES
The United States Supreme Court, in Jacobson v. United States,'85 re-
solved the issue as to time by holding that the prosecution, in order to over-
come a defendant's entrapment claim, must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime prior to en-
countering the government agents.' 86 The Court's task, therefore, involved
the resolution of the question of whether the Government had proved that
Jacobson was predisposed to receive child pornography through the mails
prior to the government's intervention.1
8 7
A. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.' 88 Recognizing the evils associated with the
proliferation of child pornography and the need for government agents to
engage in undercover operations to enforce the law effectively,' 89 the major-
ity nonetheless stated that the government's conduct was impermissible
when it implanted the disposition to commit a crime in the mind of a person
otherwise innocent.' 9 ° Since the Court conceded that Jacobson had become
disposed to commit the crime by the time he placed his order,"'9 the disposi-
tive question became whether Jacobson was so disposed at the time of the
government's first overture.' 92 The majority maintained that the govern-
ment's onus to show pre-contact predisposition was a requirement implicit in
183. Kaminski, 703 F.2d at 1008-09 (noting that "the evidence in this case was more than
adequate to prove defendant's predisposition").
184. 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992).
185. Id. at 1535.
186. Id. at 1540.
187. Id. at 1541 n.2.
188. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, and Thomas joined Justice White's majority
opinion.
189. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540.
190. Id. (citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932) and Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958)).
191. Id. at 1541.
192. Id. at 1540. The Court cited United States v. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481, 1483-84 (1991),
for the proposition that in cases such as Jacobson, where there is no dispute as to inducement,
the government "must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to
commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by Government agents." Jacobson,
112 S. Ct. at 1540.
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the language of Sorrells v. United States,193 which held that the government
could not prosecute a person for a crime generated by law enforcement
officials. 194
To determine whether Jacobson was predisposed prior to contact with the
bogus organizations or had become disposed as a result of such contact, the
majority undertook a thorough examination of the Government's evidence
of predisposition. 95 The Court noted that this evidence consisted both of
that developed prior to contact with Jacobson and that developed as a result
of the government communications. 96 As for evidence of a pre-contact pre-
disposition, the Government could point only to the Bare Boys magazines
that Jacobson had legally ordered and received in 1984.197 But, as the ma-
jority noted, a willingness to engage in conduct later criminalized is not pro-
bative of a willingness to commit an unlawful act, as citizens ordinarily
choose to obey the law out of respect for it.' 98 The Court therefore con-
cluded that Jacobson's demonstrated predisposition to view the sexually ex-
plicit photographs in accordance with the law, carried little weight in
establishing Jacobson's predisposition.' 99
The Court similarly concluded that the evidence garnered over the course
of the government's extended courtship period failed to demonstrate a pre-
contact predisposition. 2" While the Court conceded that Jacobson had
demonstrated a disposition to view sexually explicit photographs depicting
minors,20 1 the Government failed to show that Jacobson possessed a disposi-
193. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
194. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1541 n.2 (citing Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451). The majority later
maintained that the enunciated standard would not hamper law enforcement operations and
was in fact consistent with the attorney general's guideline for the conduct of undercover oper-
ations. Id. The pre-contact predisposition standard, furthermore, would still fail to yield a
meritorious entrapment defense in situations where, for example, the target immediately com-
plied with the undercover officer's overture, because "the ready commission of the criminal act
amply demonstrates the defendant's predisposition." Id. at 1541.
195. Id.
196. Id. The Court stated that "[t]he prosecution's evidence of predisposition falls into
two categories: evidence developed prior to the Postal Service's mail campaign, and that devel-
oped during the course of the investigation." Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1542. The Court reasoned that "[e]vidence of predisposition to do what once
was lawful is not, by itself, sufficient to show predisposition to do what is now illegal, for there
is a common understanding that most people obey the law even when they disapprove of it."
Id. But see United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 623 (2d Cir.) (holding that "[c]onduct
. "morally indistinguishable" ' from the offenses charged is probative on the issue of predispo-
sition") (quoting United States v. Viviano, 437 F.2d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 1971) (quoting United
States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007 (1983).
199. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1541.
200. Id. at 1542.
201. Id.; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing evidence of Jacobson's
affinity for photographs of boys engaged in sexual activity).
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tion to break the law in order to satisfy this desire.2 °2 As to the evidential
value ascribed to Jacobson's eventual decision to order the unlawful mate-
rial, the Court concluded that such a willingness suggested only that a
predisposition to break the law existed at the time Jacobson ordered the ma-
terial, some two and a half years after the government had initiated contact,
and could not have reasonably suggested a pre-existing predisposition.2 °3
The majority was clearly troubled by the conduct of the government offi-
cials and suggested that the very nature and method of the sting operation
implanted the disposition in Jacobson's mind. 2' By couching their over-
tures in terms extolling the most noble First Amendment values, 20 5 the gov-
ernment-created organizations pressured Jacobson to purchase the outlawed
material and thus become a soldier in the battle against censorship and a
protector of individual rights.2" 6 Given the nature of the government's in-
ducement, acts designed to implant the criminal disposition,2 °7 the Court
concluded that Jacobson's willingness to break the law was not born of
Jacobson's predisposition, but instead resulted from the nature of the gov-
ernment's overtures.2 ° s
Since the only evidence of predisposition was the order eventually placed
by Jacobson, which followed two and a half years of attempts to convince
Jacobson that he had a right to engage in the outlawed conduct, the Govern-
ment had failed to demonstrate that Jacobson was predisposed independent
of the government's activity.209 The Court concluded that Jacobson had
been entrapped as a matter of law and therefore reversed the decision of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.2t°
202. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1542.
203. Id. at 1541.
204. Id. at 1542. The majority argued:
[T]he strong arguable inference is that, by waving the banner of individual rights and
disparaging the legitimacy and constitutionality of efforts to restrict the availability
of sexually explicit materials, the Government not only excited petitioner's interest in
sexually explicit materials banned by law but also exerted substantial pressure on
petitioner to obtain and read such material.
Id.
205. See supra note 14.
206. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1542.
207. Id. at 1543.
208. Id. The Court quoted Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), to hammer home
the point that the government had implanted in Jacobson the unlawful disposition: "Law en-
forcement officials go too far when they 'implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposi-
tion to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may
prosecute.'" Id. (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442) (emphasis added by Jacobson Court).
209. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1543. The Court concluded that "[r]ational jurors could not
say beyond a reasonable doubt that [Jacobson] possessed the requisite predisposition prior to
the Government's investigation and that it existed independent of the Government's many and




B. Justice O'Connor's Dissent
In dissent,2"1 Justice O'Connor began by noting that the government had
offered the illegal material on two occasions, and that Jacobson had accepted
on both occasions.212 From this ready response, a jury could reasonably
have concluded that Jacobson harbored the requisite predisposition to make
the entrapment defense unavailable.2" 3 Justice O'Connor therefore stated
that the majority's holding was flawed in that it failed to recognize the rea-
sonableness of the jury's finding.214 In addition, Justice O'Connor attacked
the majority's position on the grounds that it imposed, in effect, a reasonable
suspicion requirement on the government and redefined predisposition to in-
clude a requirement that the government demonstrate a defendant's predis-
position to break the law knowingly in order to establish predisposition.21
1. The Reasonable Suspicion Requirement
The dissent argued that the very heart of the Court's holding, that the
government must demonstrate a pre-contact predisposition, contradicted
precedent,216 and stated that scrutiny of the government's conduct has tradi-
tionally been used to establish entrapment in the context of the target's re-
peated refusals to accept the government's unlawful proposal, and not to
establish the government's affirmative implantation of the criminal
disposition.
217
Justice O'Connor next suggested that the Court's holding represented a
break from previous entrapment decisions holding that the government must
show that the target was predisposed at the time the government offered the
211. Justice O'Connor's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Ken-
nedy. Justice Scalia joined the dissent in part. Id. at 1535.
212. Id. at 1543 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
213. Id. Justice O'Connor also defended the government's methodology on the ground
that the questionnaires and similar literature designed to explore the target's willingness to
break the law would not, as the catalogues might, "risk rebuff and suspicion .... shock and
offend the uninitiated, or expose minors to suggestive materials." Id. at 1544.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. The dissent cited Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372-76 (1958), for the
proposition that "a defendant's predisposition is to be assessed as of the time the Government
agent first suggested the crime, not when the Government agent first became involved." Jacob-
son, 112 S. Ct. at 1544. Furthermore, the dissent contended that the government could not
have implanted the disposition to commit the crime "[u]ntil the Government actually makes a
suggestion of criminal conduct." Id. (citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442
(1932)).
217. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1544 (citing Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958)
(holding that the defendant's lack of predisposition was evidenced, among other things, by his
repeated refusals to supply the government agent with narcotics)).
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opportunity to commit the crime.2"' The dissent contended that the newly
enunciated pre-contact predisposition requirement was tantamount to im-
posing upon government the requirement that it "have a reasonable suspi-
cion of criminal activity before it begins an investigation." '219 The dissent
feared that such a requirement would have a crippling effect on the prosecu-
tion of targets apprehended as a result of government sting operations.22°
The dissent further objected to the Court's failure to recognize a funda-
mental difference between Jacobson's situation and the circumstances which
the defendants in Sorrells v. United States 22' and Sherman v. United
States 222 encountered. In those earlier cases, the dissent argued, the govern-
ment agents employed coercive measures or otherwise encouraged the de-
fendants to break the law for some worthy ulterior purpose.2 23 In contrast,
the factor cited by the majority which unduly enticed Jacobson to acquiesce
to the government's overtures 224 merely called attention to the fruits inher-
ently attached to the crime.225 In any event, Justice O'Connor concluded,
the jury had an opportunity to weigh the evidence as to the pressure the
government exerted on Jacobson, and its determination as to Jacobson's in-
dependent willingness to order the unlawful materials was not
unreasonable.
226
218. Id. at 1545. Justice O'Connor maintained that "the inquiry is whether a suspect is
predisposed before the Government induces the commission of the crime, not before the Gov-
ernment makes initial contact with him." Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. Justice O'Connor predicted dire repercussions:
[A]fter this case, every defendant will claim that something the Government agent
did before soliciting the crime 'created' a predisposition that was not there before....
(A] bribe taker will claim that the description of the amount of money available was
so enticing that it implanted a disposition to accept the bribe .... A drug buyer will
claim that the description of the drug's purity and effects was so tempting that it
created the urge to try it ....
Id.
221. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
222. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
223. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1545. Justice O'Connor noted, for example, that the defendant
in Sorrells encountered a government agent who "repeatedly asked for illegal liquor, coaxing
the defendant to accede on the ground that 'one former war buddy would get liquor for an-
other.' " Id. (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 440). The dissent further noted that "[iln Sherman,
the Government agent played on the defendant's sympathies, pretending to be going through
drug withdrawal and begging the defendant to relieve his distress by helping him buy drugs."
Id. (citing Sherman, 356 U.S. at 371).
224. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
225. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1545. The dissent suggested that the majority's contention
that the government exerted pressure on Jacobson was not supported by the record. Id. at
1545-46.
226. Id. at 1546.
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2. The Specific Intent Requirement
Justice O'Connor also objected to what she perceived as a redefinition of
predisposition to require a showing that the defendant was predisposed to
violate the law knowingly in order to prove predisposition.227 This reasoning
resulted from the Court's acknowledgement that Jacobson was predisposed
to view sexually explicit photographs depicting minors228 and its seemingly
anomalous conclusion that such a predisposition did not support the infer-
ence that Jacobson would commit the charged crime to effectuate his de-
sire."' Justice O'Connor argued that the newly conceived specific intent
requirement was unwarranted since the predisposition requirement was
designed to make the entrapment defense unavailable to those who would
have committed the crime even if there had been no governmental induce-
ment, regardless of whether the defendant was aware that the conduct was
unlawful. 230 Finally, the dissent scolded the Court for taking the issue away
from the jury, even after the jury, as representatives of the community, had
been apprised accurately as to the nuances of entrapment law.
23'
IV. SCRUTINY FOR THE SERPENT: EVALUATING GOVERNMENTAL
CONDUCT
The majority opinion in Jacobson refined the entrapment doctrine in that
it clarified the definition of predisposition to require the government to show
that the target was disposed to commit the crime prior to his initial contact
with government agents.2 32 Such a formulation flows logically from the
227. Id. Justice Scalia elected not to join this portion of the dissenting opinion. Id. at
1543.
228. Id. at 1546.
229. Id. The dissent noted that the statute in question did "not require proof of specific
intent to break the law" and therefore charged the majority with "ignor[ing] the judgment of
Congress that specific intent is not an element of the crime of receiving sexually explicit photo-
graphs of minors." Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1547. Justice O'Connor concluded by noting that there was "no dispute that
the jury in this case was fully and accurately instructed on the law of entrapment, and nonethe-
less found Mr. Jacobson guilty .... I believe there was sufficient evidence to uphold the jury's
verdict." Id. Indeed, the jury was given instructions which incorporated the majority's pre-
disposition formulation: " 'If the defendant before contact with law-enforcement officers or their
agents did not have any intent or disposition to commit the crime charged and was induced or
persuaded by law-enforcement officers o[r] their agents to commit that crime, then he was
entrapped.' " Id. at 1540 n. I (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
232. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540. The Court cited United States v. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481,
1483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (opinion of then-Judge Thomas), to support its holding. The cited
passage, however, does not contemplate the time issue, but instead focuses on the issue of the
burden of proof. The passage notes the split between the "unitary" and "bifurcated" ap-
proaches to burdens of production and persuasion in an entrapment case, but ultimately notes
that under either approach, it is the government that must demonstrate predisposition. Id.
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prior cases, which held that the government cannot implant the criminal
disposition into the mind of the target,233 and better protects against the evil
that the entrapment defense seeks to overcome. 234 Unless the government
can prove that its target was predisposed to commit a crime at the time it
initially contacted him, there is a significant danger that the government it-
self implanted the disposition, and thereby manufactured the crime.
Justice O'Connor, in dissent, argued that the Court's holding contradicted
precedent and cited Sherman v. United States2 35 for the proposition that
predisposition need only be established as of the time the crime is sug-
gested. 23 6 The issue of time, however, was not specifically addressed in Sher-
man. In fact, the Sherman Court took note of the agent's discussions with
the target concerning their mutual struggle to overcome drug addiction,
prior to the request for narcotics, 237 and found that Sherman had been en-
trapped as a matter of law.238
Justice O'Connor further voiced her dissatisfaction with the Court's hold-
ing in stating that the government could not implant an unlawful disposition
in an innocent mind without first suggesting the commission of a crime.
2 39
Justice O'Connor noted the difference in circumstances surrounding the
Jacobson and Sherman cases: that Jacobson, unlike Sherman, immediately
acceded to the criminal conduct once it had been offered. 2" There is, how-
ever, no logical reason why the unlawful disposition cannot be implanted by
a law enforcement official who initially refrains from extending a direct re-
quest to engage in criminal conduct. If, for example, the government agent
in Sherman had played on the target's sympathy to the point where the tar-
get was convinced of the agent's dire need for narcotics, and then offered the
crime, it would be difficult to see how Sherman's quick accession, motivated
by empathy, and not the normal fruits associated with the crime, would have
There is, however, other authority which does support the Jacobson holding as to the time
issue. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
233. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 442 (1932).
234. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 444-45 (quoting Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35 (8th Cir.
1921)). The Sorrells Court adopted Judge Sanborn's argument:
"[1]t is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and to the established law of the
land to punish a man for the commission of an offense of the like of which he had
never been guilty, either in thought or in deed, and evidently never would have been
guilty of if the officers of the law had not inspired, incited, persuaded, and lured him
to attempt to commit it."
Id. (quoting Butts, 273 F. at 38).
235. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
236. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1544 (citing Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372-76).
237. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 371.
238. Id. at 373.
239. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1544 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 1545.
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yielded a different legal result. On the other hand, it is clear that an agent, in
such a situation, could implant the disposition while refraining from sug-
gesting the criminal activity. Justice O'Connor's formulation, however,
would render all of the government's pre-proposition conduct irrelevant.24
Indeed, there would be no scrutiny of the government's conduct if a target's
immediate acceptance of the unlawful offer were established, no matter how
coercive the pre-proposition suggestions had been.
The approach taken by the majority appears to address a major flaw in the
results of Hampton v. United States242 and United States v. Russell,
243
namely that any sort of governmental conduct, no matter how outrageous,
would be permissible as long as the government establishes predisposition.24
By focusing on when and how the defendant became predisposed, the Court
calls for scrutiny of the government's conduct, even where, as in Jacobson,
the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime existed before the crime
was solicited. 245 Except in cases where there is an immediate acceptance of
the government's overture, therefore, some examination of the government's
conduct is required to determine whether such conduct" 'implant[ed) in the
mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged of-
fense.' ,246 If the evidence were to show that the government's pre-solicita-
tion conduct was such as to generate the crime and instill within the target
the disposition to commit the crime, then the target would have a valid en-
trapment defense.247 The renewed scrutiny given the government in this re-
241. The dissent's contention that "a defendant's predisposition is to be assessed as of the
time the Government agent first suggested the crime, not when the Government agent first
became involved," id. at 1544, suggests that a court need only scrutinize the government's
post-proposition conduct.
242. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
243. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
244. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488-89 (stating that the entrapment defense is unavailable
where predisposition is established); see also Russell, 411 U.S. at 436 (holding that the estab-
lishment of predisposition is "fatal" to the defendant's entrapment defense).
The exception, of course, is the due process defense. See supra notes 103, 115 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the fruitless assertion of the due process defense by the defendants in
Russell and Hampton). Defendants often assert this defense but rarely prevail. See, e.g.,
United States v. Osborne, 935 F.2d 32, 36 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that the "courts have over
time continued to demonstrate a high shock threshold in the presence of extremely unsavory
government conduct"), amended on other grounds, No. 90-5691 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1991);
United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir.) (holding that the due process defense
was unavailing where government officials manipulated a woman into providing sexual favors
to its target as part of its effort to entice him into selling narcotics to undercover agents), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 898 (1987).
245. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1541 (conceding that Jacobson "had become predisposed to
break the law by [the time the crime was offered]").
246. Id. at 1543 (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932)) (emphasis
added by Jacobson Court).
247. Id.
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fined version of predisposition, therefore, ameliorates the harshness of the
per se rule enunciated in Hampton v. United States,248 and restores, to some
degree, the balance between the predisposition and inducement prongs of the
entrapment test.24a
Justice O'Connor was further concerned that the Court's holding could be
read to impose upon the government the requirement that it have a reason-
able suspicion that a target was engaged in wrongdoing before launching an
investigation. 250  The reasonable suspicion requirement, however, simply
does not flow logically from the Government's burden to demonstrate a tar-
get's pre-contact predisposition to break the law. Certainly, there could be
many instances where the Government could demonstrate that the target
was predisposed to break the law prior to contact without a reasonable sus-
picion showing.25'
United States v. Myers, 252 a case arising from the Abscam253 investigation,
provides a useful example. In that case, the undercover agents, without any
specific suspicion that the defendant Lederer was engaged in wrongdoing,
made it known they would pay cash in exchange for favorable immigration
legislation.254 Yet the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
rejected Lederer's entrapment claim because predisposition was established
by his ready response to the inducement.255 Situations such as that in My-
ers, where a jury could infer a pre-contact predisposition based on the tar-
get's quick willingness to commit the crime, demonstrate that a reasonable
suspicion requirement does not necessarily emerge from the Jacobson
Court's holding.2 56 Thus, since the Court did not impose a reasonable suspi-
248. 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976).
249. Compare supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (noting that the Sherman Court,
ostensibly applying the same subjective test utilized in Hampton and Jacobson, was troubled by
and gave considerable scrutiny to the conduct of the government agent).
250. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1545.
251. See infra note 256 and accompanying text (noting that federal appeals courts have
declined to read a reasonable suspicion requirement into the Jacobson holding).
252. 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub. nom., Lederer v. United States, 461 U.S.
961 (1983).
253. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (discussing the Abscam investigation).
254. Myers, 692 F.2d at 830. Indeed, the Myers court conceded that the government had
no reasonable suspicion prior to its contact with the defendant, then entertained and ultimately
rejected the defendant's defense on this basis. Id. at 835.
255. Id. at 836.
256. Indeed, the circuit courts have declined to impose a reasonable suspicion requirement
upon the government as a result of Jacobson. See, e.g., United States v. Hurwitz, No. 91-5504,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 16322 (4th Cir. July 16, 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1011 (1993).
The Fourth Circuit held that the defendant was not entitled to an entrapment instruction
where the government's agent had no reasonable suspicion, but merely presented the opportu-
nity for the target to engage in narcotics trafficking as a means to overcome his financial diffi-
culty. Id. at *2.
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cion requirement, Justice O'Connor's concern as to the attendant debilitat-
ing effect on law enforcement operations appears unfounded.257
Justice O'Connor's contention that the Jacobson holding requires the
prosecution to prove that the defendant knowingly violated the law258 is
equally without merit. The majority responded to this contention by simply
noting that the evidence offered by the Government, the lawful purchase of
the Bare Boys magazines and the inclination for the illegal material, was
insufficient to establish a pre-contact predisposition.259 The Court therefore
did not hold, as Justice O'Connor feared, that the government must
demonstrate that a defendant knowingly violated the law to establish
predisposition.
The result in this case is a more clear picture of the entrapment doctrine,
one that restores some level of scrutiny of the government's conduct in cases
where there is inducement. The effect on law enforcement will not be overly
burdensome. To be sure, the government's task in establishing a pre-existing
predisposition is more onerous than it would have been under Justice
O'Connor's model,2" but the Court's holding should work to deter a relent-
less law enforcement officer from seeking doggedly to induce a reluctant tar-
get. 261 Further, the result should encourage law enforcement agencies to
257. The majority noted, in response to the argument that the holding would cripple un-
dercover investigation operations, that the Attorney General's guidelines regarding undercover
operations include a reasonable suspicion requirement. Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
1535, 1541 n.2 (1992).
258. Id. at 1546.
259. Id. at 1542 n.3.
260. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's conten-
tion that the government need only show predisposition at the time the crime is solicited).
261. The wisdom of the Jacobson holding becomes evident when one examines the Ninth
Circuit's recent opinion in United States v. Skarie, 971 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1992). The defend-
ant in Skarie lived on a ranch with her abusive husband. After she forced her husband out of
the house, a distant relative of the husband who was a police informant moved into the house.
Id. at 318-19. The informant used methamphetamines in the house and repeatedly threatened
the defendant by impaling a live chicken on a stake and vowing to kidnap her son. Id.
Throughout this time, the informant asked the defendant to put him in touch with narcotics
vendors. After putting the informant off on a number of occasions, she finally agreed to put
him in touch with a methamphetamine dealer. After a sale, both buyer and seller were ar-
rested. Id.
In overturning the defendant's conviction, the court noted that the only evidence of a pre-
contact predisposition was that the defendant had used methamphetamines three years previ-
ously. Id. at 320. The remainder of the government's evidence of predisposition, including
evidence of the defendant's "active and allegedly willing participation, and [her] supposed
profit motive," was developed after the defendant's initial contact with the informant, and
therefore should not have been considered in weighing the entrapment question. Id. at 321.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit noted that "the government eventually prevailed at trial by relying
on a theory that Skarie was initially entrapped, but later became 'unentrapped.' " Id. at 321
n.5. The court was therefore able to rely on Jacobson's pre-contact predisposition standard in
reversing Skarie's conviction. Id. at 322.
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allocate their resources more efficiently,262 turning to a new task if the target
fails to acquiesce quickly.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the entrapment doctrine was first recognized by the United States
Supreme Court, its focus has steadily drifted away from scrutiny of the con-
duct of law enforcement agents toward a near-exclusive examination of
whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime charged. This
shift is best illustrated by comparing the Court's holding in Sherman v.
United States, where the Court was clearly focused on and troubled by the
conduct of the law enforcement officials, with its later holdings in United
States v. Russell and Hampton v. United States, where the nature of the gov-
ernment's activity became irrelevant once predisposition had been
established.
The Jacobson Court's holding that the government must show that the
target was predisposed to commit the alleged crime prior to contact with
government officials ameliorates the harshness of the holdings in Russell and
Hampton, and provides that in all cases except those in which contact, solici-
tation, and ready acceptance occur simultaneously, some scrutiny of the gov-
ernment's conduct is mandated. In the future, courts, adhering to the
Jacobson Court's approach, will reassume their role as defenders of the pop-
ulace against governmental excess and will indirectly provide a brand of law
enforcement less prone to overzealousness and measurably more efficient.
Brian Thomas Feeney
262. See United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., con-
curring). Judge Posner argued that entrapment is "merely the name we give to a particularly
unproductive use of law enforcement resources" and suggests that the predisposition inquiry
should focus not on "psychological conjecture" but on "a common-sense assessment of
whether it is likely that the defendant would have committed the crime" without the induce-
ment. Id. If not, society has squandered its law enforcement resources and entrapment has
occurred. Id.
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